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Abstract—Fueled by its recent success in provisioning
on-site wireless Internet access, Wi-Fi is currently perceived
as the best positioned technology for pervasive mobile
macro network offloading. However, the broad transitions
of multiple collocated operators towards this new paradigm
may result in fierce competition for the common unlicensed
spectrum at hand. In this light, our paper game-theoretically
dissects market convergence scenarios by assessing the com-
petition between providers in terms of network performance,
capacity constraints, cost reductions, and revenue prospects.
We will closely compare the prospects and strategic posi-
tioning of fixed line operators offering Wi-Fi services with
respect to competing mobile network operators utilizing
unlicensed spectrum. Our results highlight important de-
pendencies upon inter-operator collaboration models, and
more importantly, upon the ratio between backhaul and Wi-Fi
access bit-rates. Furthermore, our investigation of medium- to
long-term convergence scenarios indicates that a rethinking
of control measures targeting the large-scale monetization of
unlicensed spectrum may be required, as otherwise the used
free bands may become subject to tragedy-of-commons type
of problems.
Keywords—Wi-Fi offloading, unlicensed spectrum, tragedy
of commons, competition, resource sharing
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of broadband connections in urban in-
dustrialized areas has grown massively in recent years1.
The achievable link-rates of Cable/DSL/FTTH-based
fixed lines have steadily increased and at the same time
most Customer-Premises Equipments (CPEs) have been
gradually upgraded to include 2.4/5 GHz IEEE 802.11n
frontends, making them capable to downstream-rates
in the order of 100Mbit/s in the high SNIR region.
Recent empirical studies, e.g., [1], have shown that in
densely populated metropolitan regions the wireless cov-
erage areas of Wi-Fi enabled CPEs do already spatially
overlap. The measurement study presented in [2] also
illustrates that a dominant fixed-line broadband operator
would easily be able to aggregate its CPEs to form a
complete radio access network covering large portions
of the urban environment. The disruptiveness of this
approach for mobile radio access network operators,
1OECD: http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/
oecdbroadbandportal.htm, last accessed: June 16, 2013
however, becomes evident when considering backhaul
limitations: even if all cellular sites in a given area were
upgraded to radio access technologies with very high
spectral efficiency (LTE eNodeBs with multiple sectors
and maximum channel bandwidth), the aggregated per
area throughput will ultimately be limited by the respec-
tive backhaul capacity. While its performance limit can be
further pushed by gradually deploying dedicated high-
capacity lines, the operational cost of backhauling by
aggregation of a multitude of broadband connections in
the same area will remain strictly strictly lower.
Through the recent development of automatic client-
side network-access selection capabilities the attractive-
ness of automatic high-volume Wi-Fi offload is raised.
The majority of current smartphone/tablet platforms
already support recent standard amendments such as
IEEE 802.11u and Hotspot 2.0 as well as functionalities
to use SIM-based authentication (EAP-SIM) mechanisms.
These advancements are likely to lead to an opportunistic
use of Wi-Fi networks whenever possible, which may
effectively eliminate remaining barriers at the users’ side.
The aforementioned densification together with the
reduction of access-barriers has significantly narrowed
the gap between cellular and IEEE 802.11-based net-
works, which may potentially be disruptive for the
current radio access network industry. But which role
will densified LTE networks play in this respect? In
other words, what are the weaknesses of Wi-Fi access in
comparison to LTE small-cell networks? Seamless inter-
system handover which offers session continuity is one
feature that Wi-Fi is not able to deliver with the same
ease as cellular access – but – the expected growth in data
volume is mainly driven by services that correspond to
nomadicity, for which session continuity is not required2.
Furthermore, application service providers have started
to deploy mechanisms to cope with IP-address changes
and short outages in non-interactive services. This means
that the relevance of seamless handover has been re-
duced, while current cellular networks still center their
underlying architecture on the realization of mobile voice
2Cisco Visual Networking Index (2013): http://www.cisco.com/
en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white
paper c11-520862.pdf, last accessed: July 3, 2013
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services. Such a focus also leads to another differentiation
between the two domains, i.e., in terms of complexity
and the cost of client-side equipment. On the Bill-of-
Materials (BoM), an LTE baseband chip is up to five
times more expensive3 than an IEEE 802.11 transceiver
of the latest generation. This price difference and the
customers’ fear of additional running expenses due to
SIM contracts effectively disadvantage cellular access
over Wi-Fi in the long run.
In this paper, we argue that licensed small-cell net-
works will not become relevant in cases where the system
is noise-limited, which is the case when the physical
environment compartmentalizes the medium into units
without significant interference coupling. The major ad-
vantage of licensed access is that the hierarchical protocol
stack and the exclusive-use option allows to operate an
efficient radio resource coordination mechanism, which
is in fact also strictly needed when the spatial orthogo-
nality is not given anymore. However, spatial overlap in
the unlicensed spectrum is already observable in certain
densely populated regions. This is especially noteworthy
since many fixed and fixed/mobile operators who are
active in European and North American metropolitan
regions have started to push and roll-out Wi-Fi offload
strategies in recent months: SFR and Free in France,
Comcast, Deutsche Telekom, Belgacom, just to name a
few. This paper is, therefore, dedicated to the analysis of
tensions arising from technological and business conver-
gence of unlicensed and licensed spectrum.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows:
Section II provides an overview of related work regard-
ing mobile network offload business and technology,
after which in Section III we analytically study the for-
mation of unexpected market convergence equilibria and
dominant strategies. By scaling the problem scope to a
market dimension, we discuss a series of resulting Wi-Fi
market challenges in Section IV. Finally, in Section V we
point out a series of realistic outcome scenarios and con-
clude the paper with some final remarks in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Due to increasingly overloaded mobile 3G networks,
the offload of non-realtime traffic has recently raised
significant academic interest [3]. Although manual traffic
offload has de facto been a success story (for up to 65%
of the relevant university traffic [4]), Wi-Fi offload still
faces clear obstacles in some scenarios due to Wi-Fi re-
ception challenges of current generation smartphones—
according to [5], the majority of student traffic is still in
the 3G network. Thereby, [4] argues that proper utiliza-
tion of Wi-Fi networks may even considerably contribute
to energy savings, which underlines the ecological desir-
ability of consistent Wi-Fi offload.
For the automation of traffic offload, a feasible selec-
tion of traffic seems to be required. Siris and Kalyvas
[6] have followed up on this idea by offloading delay
tolerant traffic based on a designed mobility prediction.
Thus, a concentration on nomadic users for mobile traffic
3www.isuppli.com/teardowns/, last accessed: June 16, 2013
offload, e.g., in home scenarios, combined with mass de-
ployment of accessible Wi-Fi hotspots may be of highest
interest. In addition, application-awareness seems to be
necessary in order to optimally target user requirements,
e.g., through Quality of Experience (QoE) trials for ap-
plications which have important delay constraints4.
Differentiated by the following list of driving actors,
Casey et al. [7] have compiled a set of Wi-Fi/Femto
offload Value Network Configurations (VNCs): mobile
operators, broadband access operators (fixed line), com-
bined fixed and mobile operators, the access aggregator
role (e.g., FON5), service providers and device manufac-
turers, as well as site/venue owners. Investigating mar-
ket convergence effects, the present paper will concen-
trate on the fixed/mobile operator and access aggregator
cases. These VNCs have been elaborated by [8] in order
to illustrate two-sided market issues towards a successful
market evolution, e.g., w.r.t. required platform subsidies.
Cost aspects for offloading base station traffic to femto
cells have specifically been targeted by [9]. However,
to the best of our knowledge, the conflict of business
interests and market challenges involved in offloading
traffic from mobile networks to unlicensed spectrum Wi-
Fi solutions has not yet been targeted in literature.
III. MODEL
We will now start to analytically assess the strategic
convergence of network offloading from cellular net-
works to Wi-Fi networks (utilizing unlicensed spectrum
and fixed line Internet access) by game-theoretically in-
vestigating locally concentrated competition under weak
control mechanisms (as currently practiced in the unli-
censed spectrum environment). This section is intended
to illustrate the need for finding cooperative means for
the large-scale monetization of the unlicensed spectrum.
Fixed line 
network with 
Wi-Fi
ui
Fixed line 
network with 
Wi-Fi
uj
unlicensed spectrum licensed spectrum 
Cellular 
network
lj
offload
direct competition
new
cellular
customers
Location loc
Provider jProvider i
{{Time t
Fig. 1. A competitive market with two competing providers where
one is offloading.
Let us assume there are two competing Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs) in location loc at point in time t as
depicted in Figure 1: Provider i provides only wireless
Internet service in the unlicensed spectrum network ui
4“Apple Not Throttling iPhone or iPad Cellular Throughput
via Carrier Bundles”: http://www.anandtech.com/show/7037/
apple-not-throttling-iphones-ipads-cellular-throughput-via-carrier-bundles-,
last accessed: June 16, 2013
5http://www.fon.com/, last accessed: June 14, 2013
(backed by the fixed line backbone), while its competitor
j in addition also provides cellular Internet services in
the licensed spectrum, i.e., uj and lj. For simplification
reasons we assume both are present at the same mar-
ket/location loc at time t.
We further model the QoS q(d,C) sensitive to traffic
demands d and the available capacity C6 (i.e., the bigger
d for a given network, the higher the congestion)—
comparable to [10]. Only for the unlicensed spectrum
case the overall capacity is shared, thus in analogy to
[11] the q ∈ [0, 1] can be described as
q(dui + d
u
j ,C
u) = 1−
dui + d
u
j
Cu
(1)
where the joint capacity Cu7 is static in t and the
demand d satisfies dui + d
u
j ≤ Cu—conversely dlj ≤ Clj
for the licensed spectrum. We model the demand d
as function d{u,l}(∆p,∆q) which is decreasing in “price
distance” ∆p and increasing in ∆q, where the terms ∆p
and ∆q are defined as relative price and QoS tradeoff
over the next best alternative8, i.e., loyalty. Assuming the
user is considering an active changeover from lj to uj, i.e.,
replacing a cellular with a fixed line contract, these terms
can be described by
∆p = plj − puj , ∆q = qlj − quj .
In turn, we can specifically derive the revenue of
provider j for satisfying d from
pink (d
n
k ) = d
n
k p
n
k = d
n
k (∆p,∆q)p
n
k , (2)
where pnk describes the price charged by provider k
which is of type n, by the sum of revenues in uj and lj,
piuj (d
u
j ) + pi
l
j(d
l
j) , (3)
and conversely for i’s unlicensed spectrum network.
Thus whenever provider j starts to offload traffic,
the shared spectrum is challenged—according to (1) the
cellular network attractivity in terms of QoS and p
relatively rises on the expense of Wi-Fi networks. From
the formulation of d we can infer that the demand will
shift towards relatively better alternatives (as well as the
opposite), if available—i.e., the prospective demand of
j’s cellular network increases with its improved QoS or
decreasing QoS of i’s network.
Let us also assume that the cost per bit per Hertz9
6In the case of Wi-Fi, C represents the physical capacity minus intra-
customer site traffic.
7Wi-Fi spectrum being unassigned to specific providers or users
8Current contract serves as reference point, while absolute access fees
may also limit the user exclusion rate.
9This encompasses spectrum fees and backhauling costs. Also note
that real-world investment cost curves for meeting capacity demands
are discrete rather than continuous. However, we assume the con-
trol over the degree of offloading (especially w.r.t. locally available
resources) is coarse-granular, thus costs per bit E are a feasible metric.
E satisfies Elj > E
u
j , which may be explained by the
immanent resource scarcity in cellular networks (lim-
ited excess resources due to limited available spectrum)
in addition to high license fees. In practice, the price
pl for cellular network customers is higher than for
its unlicensed spectrum counterpart pu (Wi-Fi)—thus,
pil(d′) > piu(d′) for any given d′.
Due to offloaded cellular traffic, capacity in lj is freed
up to be resold to new cellular customers, which may
impair the QoS of i and j’s Wi-Fi network. Under these
conditions a dominant incentive to offload traffic from
the cellular network lj to uj exists for player j as long
as QoS(duj ) > QoS(d
l
j) holds and p and thus ∆p remains
static10. This is explained by the revenue prospects of
reselling freed capacity, the lower cost per bit E in
the fixed line, and unimpaired demand dlj and thus pi
l
j
from existing customers which are not aware of these
offloading practices, while the revenue- and demand-
effective externality of decreasing QoS in the unlicensed
spectrum is equally shared between i and j. Beyond that
point, offload is still dominant whenever cost reductions,
Elj − Euj > 0, together with revenues from reselling freed
capacity still exceeds the demand and revenue loss in uj.
By utilizing application-aware offloading strategies,
e.g., isolation of sensitive traffic types, a second dominant
incentive exists to offload as much low priority bulk
traffic as possible, while sensitive traffic, e.g., video con-
ferences, is kept in the cellular network. Thus, selective
offloading may even be feasible if QoS(duj ) ≤ QoS(dlj).
Due to the higher costs and the unique selling point
of high quality cellular networks, quality optimization
efforts of ISPs will be centered on these networks. Thus,
when dui + d
u
j + d
l
j represents the constant total demand
at 〈loc, t〉 and QoS(dui ) ∼= QoS(duj ) due to shared spectra,
then there exists an incentive for j to assure QoS(dlj) >
QoS(dui/j). While in the unshared spectrum the loss of
quality and demand is shared, the full revenue potential
can be targeted by j’s licensed spectrum network lj.
Summarizing what has been said for intra-provider
offloading strategies, offloading is dominant whenever
one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) ∆qj < 0,
(ii) pilj or C yields outperform pi
u
j reductions, (iii) bulk
traffic is offloaded without the customer being necessar-
ily aware of it.
Therefore, we apply this model to a system with
two application types z = {b, v} ordered by increasing
quality demands, i.e., lowest quality q requirements for
bulk traffic b as well as premium traffic in the form of
highly delay-sensitive video conferences v. Then an intra-
provider equilibrium demand duj ∗ results whenever for any
marginal piece of bulk traffic provider j is indifferent
10Unaccounted traffic may slightly lower the price for the end
customer depending on the specific charging regime
between offloading to uj or retaining in lj:
lj → uj :
(
quj (d
u
j ‘) < qz=b
)
∧
(
quj (d
u
j ) > qz=b
)
(4)
=⇒ q(duj ∗) = qz=b , (5)
where duj ‘ = d
u
j + e for some e > 0. Thus, a conver-
gence around the minimum quality requirements qz=b
for bulk traffic, i.e., high utilization of uj, is inferred,
which reflects the conditions (i) to (iii).
Beyond that, the sharing of the freely available Wi-Fi
spectrum, i.e., a common good, also postulates a com-
petition over resources between i and j. Corresponding
to j’s intra-domain equilibrium, i’s best response is high
rather than low utilization, i.e., lowering utilization shifts
revenues from i to j, as qu rises and can be traded for qlj.
Due to higher p and thus revenues, both i and j strive
for increasing the volume of carried v traffic.
A second stage inter-provider equilibrium thus exists,
whenever for a marginal piece of premium traffic z = v
provider j becomes indifferent between keeping traffic in
uj or lj (in analogy to [12]):(
qlj(d
l
j“) < qz=v
)
∧
(
qlj(d
l
j) > qz=v
)
(6)
=⇒ q(dlj∗) = qz=v , (7)
where dlj“ = d
l
j“(z = b) + d
l
j“(z = v) and
dlj“(z = v) = d
l
j(z = v) + e ,
dlj“(z = b) = d
l
j(z = b)− e‘
for some e > 0 and e‘ ≥ 0, as well as sufficient
premium demand dlj(z = b) exists and pi
l
j(δ) > pi
u
i,j(δ), as
the overall demand is constant. Thus, j has no incentive
to provision a QoS level above qz=b, thus q(dui,j) will
settle at qz=b due to (7). Thus, i’s dominate strategy is
to materialize all possible bulk traffic, as premium traffic
under resource scarcity in 〈loc, t〉 will be captured by lj.
While in the first phase, the efficient freeing up of
cellular network capacity through Wi-Fi offloading (also
raising the quality level) may be attractive (and dom-
inant), the control over the unlicensed spectrum may
become of strategical relevance. On the one hand, the
provider best utilizing the available unlicensed spectrum
will profit from capacity gains (increased revenue due to
higher demand and more capacity11)—an equilibrium at
high utilization of all providers and yielding a moderate
QoS will exist (as long revenue effective or reducing
costs). As a consequence, this leads to the tragedy of the
commons where externalities caused by inconsiderate use
of common resources are ignored. On the other hand,
today’s fixed line operators are actively striving towards
11Probably also higher prices due to increased demand.
Wi-Fi services (due to customer interest) and may aim at
complementing cellular network services. In this light,
provider j may improve its strategical positioning by
overloading shared spectrum in order to raise the relative
QoS advantage of their cellular network services. In
saturated markets, strategic optima may hence converge
towards the blockage of shared spectrum rendering the
position of combined cellular and fixed line operators
strategically beneficial. Note that in practice, a full uti-
lization of shared spectrum in 〈loc, t〉 and especially in
a whole market may not be fully synergistically control-
lable and competition in both unlicensed and licensed
spectrum may avoid such a convergence12.
With the sketched mechanism a simple two class
system is established (lj as premium and uj as standard
class), where additionally premium services keeping all
bulk traffic of a customer in lj may be sold.
IV. MARKET SCALE
Loosely pairing the implications of our model with
market-level considerations, a natural competition be-
tween one provider’s own unlicensed and licensed spec-
trum wireless Internet offers may arise. Considering the
upcoming unconstrained bandwidth offers in cellular Inter-
net access, as currently appearing in Europe13, combined
with an efficient offloading mechanism (e.g., directly ac-
cessing Wi-Fi access points of other unlicensed spectrum
customers), fixed line access contract may appear redun-
dant to many customers, as long as the alternative service
coverage is acceptable. This, may lead to oscillations
between states of abandoning fixed line access and re-
deploying fixed access points due to reduced coverage
or service quality.
As an interesting case in Wi-Fi offload scenarios,
customers situated in densely populated areas or close
to points of interest may provide Wi-Fi access to a broad
range of visitors who would previously have been using
licensed spectrum roaming, whenever upcoming global
agreements, e.g., with FON, turn into practice. This may
on the one hand impair the customer’s QoS through
limited wireless or even backhaul resources, unless dedi-
cated primary-customer prioritization techniques are ap-
plied. On the other hand, paying for Internet access may
also appear to be unjustified or unfair to the primary
customers sharing their connectivity. Therefore, compen-
sation schemes may become necessary in order to reach
an equilibrium in which both reasonable coverage as well
as perceived fairness are achieved for the vast majority
of customers involved.
Active sabotage through unlicensed spectrum over-
load may be an interesting extremum in weakly competi-
tive markets facing greedy incumbent players or monop-
olists. Thus, while no customer of their own is present14,
sabotaging may artificially limit the capabilities of Wi-Fi.
12This may be compared to business strategies of artificial scarcities
under collusion or cartels.
13“3 SuperFlat”: http://www.drei.at/webshop/
prepareSelectionTarifDetail.do?tarifId=ATS0076&snId=C72633, last
accessed: June 14, 2013
14This would necessitate smart access point devices at customer sites
V. OUTCOME SCENARIOS
The present section will outline three realistic
medium- to longer-term convergence scenarios being
inferred from the discussed market challenges in Sec-
tion IV. Above all, we will differentiate by cases where
for a given tuple 〈loc, t〉 sufficient or insufficient high-
speed Internet access backhaul resources Cb are available
to meet the Wi-Fi capacity Cu at 〈loc, t〉.
For the case where Cb ≥ Cu, the capacity sharing may
result in two distinct equilbria:
1) Self-balancing: The usage of the Wi-Fi network will
reach a stable equilibrium after a series of transi-
tions between the fixed and cellular Internet access
technologies. In the optimal case, the Wi-Fi quality
is fostered through an improved or even optimal
distribution of access points.
2) System deadlock: The Wi-Fi network as strategic
resource is intentionally or unintentionally impaired
or destroyed. This may be caused by cellular oper-
ators attempting to artificially increase the value of
their licensed spectrum resources through excessive
Wi-Fi offload (tragedy of the commons), or by churn-
ing fixed Internet customers who see themselves
treated unfairly with respect to the value they add
to and receive from their commercial offerings (due
to Wi-Fi offload), thus reducing the global availabil-
ity/density of Wi-Fi access points.
For the opposite case, i.e., Cu > Cb, another conver-
gence point is of interest:
3) Backhaul-based limitation: Whenever the access
bandwidth aggregate across multiple operators gen-
erally exceeds the available Wi-Fi capacities in com-
mon scenarios (e.g., an urban setting with typical
access link / Wi-Fi placement density), there will be
no formation of a tragedy of the commons-situation.
In other words, Wi-Fi capacity does not represent the
limiting factor in terms of bandwidth, rendering the
wireless last hop transparent in end-to-end available
bandwidth considerations for the individual users.
The distinction between Cu being greater than Cb
or vice versa is dependent on factors that all strongly
depend on the location and on the given backhaul infras-
tructure, which needs to be systematically understood in
further work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Whenever capacity is scarce, combined unlicensed
spectrum (Wi-Fi) and licensed spectrum (cellular net-
work) providers tend to economically advance (rev-
enue, market powers, etc.) on the expense of Wi-Fi-only
providers. The present work has been able to illustrate
equilibria shifting premium traffic to cellular networks
and bulk traffic to highly utilized Wi-Fi networks. Thus,
while cellular networks may constitute quality as unique
selling point, the revenues of Wi-Fi networks transitively
face a localized endangerment. By scaling these consid-
erations to a market dimension, we have been able to
find indicators for phenomenona of market oscillations—
cyclic thinning and expansion of Wi-Fi product adoption.
Whenever sufficient backhaul bandwidth is present, i.e.,
whenever Wi-Fi represents the bottleneck, the market
may be self-balancing, i.e., optimal utilization of avail-
able spectrum, or may on the other hand culminate in a
system deadlock due to overutilization (tragedy of com-
mons) or underutilization (insufficient Wi-Fi customer
stock). On the contrary, whenever Wi-Fi capacity out-
performs the backhaul high-speed access, no tragedy of
commons is inferred, i.e., Wi-Fi is in capacity abundance.
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